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THE FORUM NON CONVENIENS DOCTRINE AND
THE JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF MULTINATIONAL




This century has seen the development of the large-scale mul-
tinational corporation' (MNC"), an entity whose transactions
can s an several continents and establish contacts with many na-
tions. The growth of these businesses, along with procedural in-
novations in jurisdiction, has created an environment easily ex-
ploited by forum shopping plaintiffs seeking to recover large
awards against MNCs. Generous in personam jurisdiction provi-
sions often permit plaintiffs to sue defendant MNCs in several dif-
ferent state or federal courts, thereby providing plaintiffs with a
broad choice of fora. This flexibility in choice of forum, coupled
with significant pro-plaintiff elements in U.S. courts, has made
the United States a particularly 4 attractive forum for plaintiffs
seeking to recover against MNCs.
* J.D. Candidate, 1998, University of Pennsylvania Law School; A.B.,
1994, Cornell University. I thank Professor Stephen Burbank for introducing
me to the field of international litigation and its complexities, and Melissa Choi
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The term multinational corporation is "[i]n a strict sense.., descriptive
of a firm which has centers of operation in many countries in contrast to an
'international firm' which does business in many countries but is based in only
one country, though the terms are often used interchangeably." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1016 (6th. ed. 1990). For the purposes of this Comment, multi-
national corporations include "international firms."
2 See Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1335
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that since World War 11, multinational enterprises
have become a major factor in the world scene).
3 Forum shopping "occurs when a party attempts to have his action tried
in a particular court or jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most fa-
vorable judgment or verdict." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 655.
4 See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIvIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 3-5 (3d ed. 1996) (contrasting litigation in U.S. courts to that
in other countries' courts).
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As forum shopping in the United States has become more fea-
sible and desirable, technological advances in transportation and
an increase in transnational activity have increased the potential
number of international suits that plaintiffs can bring in the
United States.5 The result has been a dramatic increase in the
number of international or foreign disputes brought in the United
States against MNCs. 6 American courts have responded, through
certain procedural reforms and refinements, to the increase in fo-
rum shopping involving foreign plaintiffs. The most notable of
these is an expansion of the old doctrine of forum non conveniens.
7
This Comment argues that the use of the forum non conveni-
ens doctrine has evolved to solve the peculiar problems posed by
international forum shopping8 and that U.S. courts should con-
tinue to make pragmatic use of the doctrine to protect MNCs
from the burdens of defending foreign suits in the United States.
Section 2 examines the factors underlying international forum
shopping in suits brought against MNCs in the U.S. courts. Sec-
tion 3 presents a normative evaluation of international forum
shopping. This discussion suggests that tolerance of international
forum shopping creates inefficiencies and conflicts with basic no-
tions of comity and respect for foreign sovereignty. Section 4
then traces the evolution and use of the forum non conveniens in
federal and state courts as a means of controlling forum shopping.
Section 5 evaluates and rejects criticisms of the current use of fo-
rum non conveniens doctrine. Finally, Section 6 argues that other
suggested judicial responses to the problem of international forum
shopping would be inferior to the current use of forum non con-
veniens.
5 See Brooke Clagett, Comment, Forum Non Conveniens in International
Environmental Tort Suits: Closing the Doors of U.S. Courts to Foreign Plaintiffs, 9
TuL. ENvTL. L.J. 513, 519 (1996).
6 See id. at 519.
7 See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 251 (1981).
8 For the purposes of this Comment, "international forum shopping"
means forum shopping in which at least one alternate forum is foreign.
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2. DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL FORUM SHOPPING IN U.S.
COURTS
2.1. Expansion of In Personam Jurisdiction and Increased
Opportunities for Forum Shopping
In order to forum shop, a plaintiff must have a choice of fo-
rums. During this century, U.S. courts have significantly ex-
panded the standards for in personam jurisdiction as the Supreme
Court has moved away from strict territorial limits on jurisdic-
tion and towards the more generous "minimum contacts" ap-
proach employed in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.9 Ex-
pansion of jurisdiction has provided international forum shoppers
with a greater opportunity to find at least one U.S. court with ju-
risdiction over a given defendant.'0 In addition, these liberalized
jurisdiction rules have increased the range of forum choices
within the federal system and the opportunity of finding a par-
ticularly favorable U.S. court." Thus, plaintiffs can simultane-
ously engage in both international forum shopping and domestic
forum shopping within the United States.
In order for a court to take jurisdiction over parties to a dis-
pute, either a federal or a state statute must support the exercise of
jurisdiction.' 2 Moreover, the Court's jurisdiction must meet the
constitutional due process requirements of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments.' 3 Each state has a long-arm statute that gov-
erns the authority of courts in that state to take personal jurisdic-
tion over defendants.' 4  Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, federal courts follow the limits of the long-arm statute
of the state in which they sit for state law claims, but have a
broader grant of jurisdiction for certain federal question suits.
15
Many states' long-arm statutes grant jurisdiction to the fullest ex-
9 326 U.S. 310 (1945); cf Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
10 See Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shoppin&, Domestic and International, 63
TUL. L. REv. 553, 556 (1989) (noting that jurisdiction is no ionger limited to
defendants who are present physically within the forum s territory).
11 See id.
12 See BORN, supra note 4, at 67-68.
13 See id.
14 See id
15 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k).
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tent allowed by the U.S. Constitution 16 and most other states
come close to granting jurisdiction to the limits of due process.l1
Consequently, the Supreme Court's interpretations of due process
limitations on jurisdiction are, in many instances, the only limita-
tions on a court's assertion of jurisdiction over a defendant. 8
Under the Supreme Court's due process analysis, personal ju-
risdiction may be either specific or general. Specific jurisdiction
exists when the dispute relates to a defendant's contacts with the
forum. 9 General jurisdiction, by contrast, occurs when a defen-
dant's contacts with a forum state are of such significance that a
court has authority over that defendant for any dispute, reardless
of whether or not it arises out of contacts to the forum. Due
process requires that, in cases of specific jurisdiction, the defen-
dant have "certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.'" 21 Seemingly, cases brought un-
der specific jurisdiction present little opportunity for illegitimate
forum shopping because the controversy must have at least
"minimum contacts" to the forum." Nevertheless, courts have
given the "minimum contacts" test such broad effect that a court
may properly assert specific jurisdiction over a defendant whose
contacts to the forum are slight.23 In products liability suits, for
example, a corporate defendant need not directly engage in con-
16 See BORN, supra note 4, at 68 (discussing federal and state constitutional
limits on statutory authorization for judicial jurisdiction).
17 See id. (noting that "some state laws incorporate the due process limits of
the fourteenth amendment").
18 Service of process may also impose practical difficulties and expenses for
plaintiffs seeking to serve defendants located outside of U.S. territory. See id. at
757-73.
19 See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
PLEADING AND PROCEDURE, STATE AND FEDERAL 212 (7th ed. 1994).
20 See id. at 211-12.
21 International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Mil-
liken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
22 See id
23 See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Mag., 465 U.S: 770 (1984) (asserting that ju-
risdiction over publisher of national magazine is proper in any state where
magazine is distributed); see also FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE
65 (4th ed. 1992) (observing that "[s]ince 1960 the Supreme Court has sustained
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duct within the forum state as long as it knowingly, places into the
stream of commerce a product for use in that state. 2
General jurisdiction poses even greater opportunities for
abuses in forum shopping because the dispute may have no con-
nection to the defendant's activities within the forum state.
Courts have found general jurisdiction to exist over corporate de-
fendants who conduct "continuous and systematic" business ac-
tivities within the forum state.25 For MNCs, operation of a
branch office or division within a state can suffice for the imposi-
tion of general jurisdiction.2 6  Similarly, a corporation is subject
to general jurisdiction in its state of incorporation.
2 7
In some instances, a court can also exercise jurisdiction over a
parent MNC based on the subsidiaries' contacts with the forum,
or vice versa.2 8 Traditionally, as long as the parent and its sub-
sidiary observed separate corporate formalities, a court would not
impute the contacts of one to the other.29  During this century,
however, courts have become more willing to find an alter ego re-
lationship between a parent and its subsidiary and thus, to impose
jurisdiction.3 0  Under the tests used in recent decisions, a court
may find alter ego status when a parent exercises a significant de-
gree of direct operational control over its subsidiary or when the
operations of the parent and its subsidiary are sufficiently inte-31
grated. Some courts have not stopped with the imputation of
24 See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.
2d 432 (1961).
25 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438, 445 (1952).
26 See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406,
425 (9th Cir. 1977) (noting that a corp oration may be present in a jurisdiction
where it operates a division); see afso BORN, supra note 4, at 113, 162-63
(discussing the jurisdictional implications of maintaining unincorporated
branch offices or divisions).
27 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS S 41 (1971);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW S 421(2) (e) (1987).
28 See, e.g., Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1333-
34 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). See generally BORN, supra note 4, at 151-70 (examining ju-
risdiction based on corporate affiliations).
29 See, e.g., Cannon Mfg. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 337 (1925).
30 A finding of alter ego status is conceptually similar somewhat to piercing
the corporate veil in limited liability disputes and allows a court to impute the
contacts of one entity to the other. See BORN, supra note 4, at 152-63. Born
states, however, that because "corporate veil-piercing standards for jurisdiction
and liability differ significantly,... jurisdiction can exist where liability does
not." Id. at 153.
31 See id
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contacts between subsidiaries and parents, but have also exercised
jurisdiction over foreign corporations that conduct business in the
forum indirectly through the actions of a separate corporation.
3 2
As a result of the relaxation of the requirements of jurisdic-
tion, most large MNCs, especially those based in the United
States, as well as those based in foreign nations, are subject to suit
in virtually every state in the United States.33 These entities have
felt the effects of increased forum shopping that have resulted
from this expansion of jurisdiction.34 The new rules, however,
have mainly increased plaintiffs' capacity to forum shop only
against large corporate defendants that have contacts with multi-
ple fora.35  Forum shopping in the international context almost
always occurs when the defendant is a large MNC, rather than a
natural person.
3 6
2.2. Pro-plaintiff Characteristics of U.S. Courts
Certain procedural features of the U.S. courts encourage
plaintiffs in international disputes to bring their cases in the
United States.37 First, the Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments
32 See, e.g., United Rope Distrib. v. Kimberly Line, 770 F. Supp. 128, 132
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("A foreign corporation may be subject to jurisdiction...
When a separate corporation, acting with its authority and for its substantial
benefit, carries out activities... 'that if [the foreign corporation] did not have a
representative to perform them, the corporation's own officials would under-
e . ( oting Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 385 F.2d 116, 1212d Cir. 1967))
33 See Adrian G. Duplantier, Louisiana: A Forum, Conveniens Vel Non, 48
LA. L. REv. 761, 780-81, 786-87 (1988).
34 See Juenger, supra note 10, at 557.
35 See JAMES, supra note 23, at 65 (noting that "[s]ince 1960 the Supreme
Court has sustained almost every state assertion of jurisdiction over interstate
businesses involved in local transactions but has reversed states' attempts to as-
sert jurisdiction over nonresident persons"); Note, Forum Shopping Reconsid-
ered, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1677, 1691-92 (1990).
36 See Note, supra note 35, at 1694.
37 Commentators generally agree that the following factors encourage
plaintiffs to sue in the United States: the availability of contingency fees, a-
sence of fee shifting, jury trials and the tendency of American juries to award
high damages, extensive pre-trial discovery, choice of different state forums
with differing choice of law rules, and favorable American substantive law, in-
cluding strict liability and possibility of punitive damages, possibility of class
action suits, low court filing fees, and the sophistication of American lawyers
and courts. See Piper Aircr-aft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 n.18 (1981);
David Boyce, Note, Foreign Plaintiffs and Forum Non Conveniens: Going Beyond
Reyno, 64 TEX. L. REV. 193, 196-97 (1985); Note, supra note 35, at 1682.
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give plaintiffs the right to trial by jury in most civil suits.38 Jury
trials present several advantages to individual plaintiffs in civil
suits against large businesses. " American jurors have very differ-
ent backgrounds and economic sympathies compared to those of
the professional judges and career bureaucrats who decide disputes
in most foreign courts.40  Consequently, these juries are more
likely to award judgment to individual plaintiffs suing large
MNCs. 41 U.S. juries also award more generous damages than do
foreign tribunals, particularly in instances of plaintiffs alleging in-
jury by a corporate entity.42 For example, in the infamous litiga-
tion stemming from an industrial accident in Bhopal, India, the
estimated value of the suit in India was no more than $75 mil-
lion.43 In contrast, experts estimated that an American jury
would award compensatory damages of $235 million, with an
even greater amount for punitive damages.44 Furthermore, the
U.S. jury system allows a plaintiff's attorney to take a tactical role
in jury selection and thereby select an audience more receptive to
the plaintiff's claims.
45
38 See JAMES, supra note 23, at 411-13.
'9 These advantages apply to both domestic and foreign plaintiffs. Empiri-
cal evidence suggests that American jurors have received- freign plaintiffs fa-
vorably. See Kevin M Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in Ameri-
can Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1122 (1996) (claiming that foreign
plaintiffs win 80% of cases they bring in U.S. courts, as compared with domes-
tic plaintiffs who win only 64% of their cases).
40 See BORN, supra note 4, at 4.
41 See id.
42 See Duplantier, supra note 33, at 786-87; see also Juenger, supra note 10, at
562 (citing a case brought in the United States in which two orphaned daugh-
ters of an English couple killed in a McDonnell Douglas airplane received over
40 times the maximum amount recoverable under the Warsaw Convention lim-
its on damages for international airline accidents). Moreover, certain jurisdic-
tions, such as Bay City, Texas, are renowned for providing extremely high
damage awards. See Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a Venue: The Need
for More Limits on Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 278 (1996) (noting that Bay
City, Texas has been "likened by some attorneys to the Ebled City of Gold be-
cause of the large personal injury damages awarded there").
43 See Douglas J. Besharov, Forum-Shopping, Forum-Skipping, and the Prob-
lem of International Competitiveness, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW
139, 141 (Walter Olson ed., 1988).
44 See ida
45 See Note, supra note 35, at 1679 n.7 (noting that the English system dif-
fers because jurors "may be challenged only before being sworn or questioned").
Plaintiffs can also affect the choice of tribunal through"judge-shopping" by
carefully timing the filing of a claim in jurisdictions that assign judges on pre-
1998]
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Second, contingency fees make litigation more accessible to
indigent plaintiffs and provide risk averse plaintiffs with a form of
insurance.46 Indigent plaintiffs may face difficulty bringing claims
against MNCs in foreign countries that lack legal aid and have
high filing fees. 47 As a result, the availability of contingency fees
alone is sometimes a sufficient incentive for plaintiffs to bring a
foreign cause of action in the United States. Even for wealthier
plaintiffs, contingent fees make suits in the United States more at-
tractive by reducing the risks of bringing suit. Lawyers who ac-
cept contingency fees act as insurers of sorts, assuming the risks
that the litigation will prove expensive or unproductive.49 The
so-called "American system" in which the losing party does not
have to pay the expenses of the winner also reduces plaintiffs'
risks in litigation and encourages risk averse plaintiffs to sue in the
United States.50 This factor could take on special significance in
international suits because large MNC defendants may spend
more on litigation, thereby exposing plaintiffs to greater risks in
forums that allow fee shifting.
Third, U.S. procedural rules facilitate plaintiffs' asserting
claims and surviving summary disposition. Liberal pleading rules
used by most courts in the United States allow plaintiffs to enter
court with vague claims. 5 1 U.S. courts also permit much broader
pre-trial discovery rules than do most foreign courts.52 Extensive
pre-trial discovery benefits plaintiffs by allowing them to initiate
dictable rotations. See id. at 1678. Because American judges' individual opin-
ions can be determined from their signed opinions, the practice of udge shop-
ping can have a significant effect on the outcome of litigation. This tactic,
however, is generally unavailable to plaintiffs suing in civil law countries. See
id. (noting that "unlike the civil law system, in which the identity of the judge
is much less a matter of public record or significance, the common law system's
focus on the judge increases the availability of forum shopping").
46 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsIS OF LAW 567-68 (4th ed.
1992) (observing that banks and other lenders may be risk averse and therefore
unwilling to fund litigation).
47 See Boyce, supra note 37, at 199.
48 See id.
49 See POSNER, supra note 46, at 567-68 (noting that the lawyer can pool
risks by charging contingent fees for many claims).
50 See id. at 572.
51 See BORN, supra note 4, at 4 (discussing procedural aspects of U.S. litiga-
tion that favor plaintiffs).
52 English courts do not permit oral depositions of parties or any discovery
from non-parties, and civil law countries generally prohibit lawyers from talk-
ing to witnesses before trial. See Boyce, supra note 37, at 200.
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proceedings with little evidence and to acquire evidence that
might otherwise be unavailable.5 3  Plaintiffs in U.S. courts also
benefit tactically because discovery greatly increases defendants'
litigation costs and improves plaintiffs' bargaining positions in
settlement negotiations. Moreover, class actions and other pro-
cedures allowed in U.S. courts decrease the economic costs of
large-scale litigation and subsequently allow large groups of indi-
vidual plaintiffs, each with little monetary interest in the dispute,
to bring suit against a defendant.
55
In addition to the procedural advantages of suing in the
United States, plaintiffs in U.S. courts can manipulate choice of
law rules to obtain favorable substantive law. Because jurisdic-
tional requirements are so easy to satisfy in U.S. courts, plaintiffs
will often have several forums from which to choose. Each state
has its own choice of law rules; therefore, plaintiffs can usually
find at least one court that offers a plaintiff-friendly rule.57 The
potential to manipulate choice of law has increased as courts have
moved away from the common law approach, which offered con-
sistent choice of law rules tending to make forum shopping diffi-
cult.58 Modern choice of law tends to emphasize the forum and
thus provides greater incentives for forum shopping.59  Re-
characterization and other techniques favored by modern choice
of law provide more opportunities for plaintiffs to manipulate
choice of law to their advantage and thus further encourage forum- 60
shoppers to sue in U.S. courts. Defendants cannot counter fo-
53 See Juenger, supra note 10, at 561-62.
See BORN, supra note 4, at 4 (describing a plaintiff's "substantial leverage
in negotiating settlement of marginal or unwinnable suits").
See RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX
LITIGATION 295 (2d ed. 1992).
56 See supra Section 2.1.
57 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 250 (1981); Boycesupra
note 37, at 203.
58 Coin ae the strict rule of the RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
3783 (1934) tating that "[t~he law of the place of wrong determines whether a
person has sustained a legal injuxy") with the loose approach announced in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOD OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971) (stating that
the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include ta) the
needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the
forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states").
59 See Juenger, supra note 10, at 558.
60 See id. at 559, 561 (observing that foreign plaintiffs suing in the United
States can circumvent Warsaw Convention limits on damages for international
1998]
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rum shopping for choice of law rules by removal to federal courts
because federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the same
choice of law rules as the state in which they sit.
61
3. PROBLEMS WITH FORUM SHOPPING IN INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION
Forum shopping in international litigation differs from do-
mestic forum shopping in certain important respects. First, the
choice of forum 6 enerally makes a greater difference in interna-
tional litigation. Because the U.S. courts uniformly offer such
significant procedural advantages to plaintiffs, the United States is
almost always the preferred forum. Thus, plaintiffs often bring
in U.S. courts cases arising in foreign nations, but rarely do they
bring in foreign courts cases originating in the United States.6
This is especially true of tort suits brought against MNCs.6s
Compared to foreign courts, the differences among courts in the
various U.S. states are relatively small.66 For this reason, a plain-
air accidents and simultaneously receive the benefits of strict liability by alleg-
ing that a product defect caused the plane crash).
61 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 491 (1941)see
also juenger, supra note 10, at 559, 561.
See BORN, supra note 4, at 3 (noting that forum selection is particularly
important in international disputes).
63 See David W. Robertson & Paula K. Speck, Access to State Courts in Tran-
snational Personal Injury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions,
68 TEX. L. REv. 937, 938 (1990) (stating that"[p]ersonal injury victims are vir-
tually always better off suing in the United States, and defendants in transna-
tional cases usually vigorously resist being sued here" and that"[t]he battle over
where the litigation occurs is typically the hardest fought and most important
issue in a transnational case; if the defendant wins this battle, the case is often
effectively over"); see also George A. Bermann, The Use ofAnti-Suit Injunctions
in International Litigation, 28 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 589, 617 (1990)
(noting that anti-suit injunctions in England are usually targeted towards
American courts); Juenger, supra note 10, at 560 (concluding that the majority
of international forum shopping involves tort actions litigated in the United
States).
64 See Duplantier, supra note 33, at 782 (observing that the Fifth Circuit has
seen "hundreds of personal injury and wrongful death claims having no connec-
tion with the United States, filed on behalf-of foreign plaintiffs by local attor-
neys").
65 See Sheila L. Birnbaum & Douglas W. Dunham, Foreign Plaintiffs and
Forum Non Conveniens, 16 BROOK. J. INT'LL. 241, 243 (1990) ("In an effort to
take advantage of the less stringent burden of proof under American products
liability law,.., an increasing number of foreign plaintiffs are instituting prod-
ucts liability suits in the United States.").




tiff in domestic litigation does not usually have as strong a motive
to engage in forum shopping.
Second, the factors which encourage plaintiffs to forum shop
in international disputes are different from those which encourage
domestic forum shopping. Most international forum shopping is
motivated by a desire to take advantage of the procedural, not
substantive, legal advantages that U.S. courts offer.67 The differ-
ences between the procedures of U.S. courts and foreign courts
are far greater than those between any two American courts.
68
The basic procedural elements of jury trial, contingency fees, lack
of fee shifting, and pre-trial discovery exist in virtually every state.
For this reason, domestic forum shoppers primarily seek to gain
more favorable substantive law and not the procedural advantages
which draw plaintiffs to the United States in international dis-
putes.
69
In general, the acceptability of forum shopping is a controver-
sial topic. Neither judges nor legal commentators have formed a
consensus opinion regarding whether or not courts should toler-
ate forum shopping.7  Although courts frequently attack the idea
of forum shopping, they often tolerate plaintiffs' attempts to se-
cure more favorable laws and juries.
7 1
The most obvious problem with forum shopping is that it al-
lows plaintiffs to exploit loopholes in the system. By permitting
forum shopping, courts allow plaintiffs to gain an unfair advan-
tage over defendants because plaintiffs generally have greater con-
67 See Juenger, supra note 10, at 573 (commenting that some plaintiffs' at-
torneys researched choice of law principles only after they had already filed the
cases in the United States); see also Bermann, supra note 63, at 617.
68 See BORN, supra note 4, at 3 ("Procedural, substantive, and choice-of-law
rules differ far more significantly from country to country than they do from
state to state within the United States.").
69 See Juenger, supra note 10, at 572.
70 See Norwood, supra note 42, at 287.
71 See id. at 291-92, 305 (noting that unlike judge shopping, forum shopping
is usually permitted).
7 Some argue that the concern for uniformity is unrealistic and that ille-
gitimate formalist and positivist notions are behind the attacks on forum shop-
ping. See Note, supra note 35, at 1684-86 (asserting that the reasons for the
courts' dislike of forum shopping are based on formalist and positivist concep-
tions of law and "draw on legitimating myths about the nature of law, a reluc-
tance to acknowledge that social and political biases shape the law, and widely-
shared views about the proper role of chance in judicial outcomes");see also id.
at 1689 (arguing that the "formalistic underpinnings of the policy against forum
shopping call into question its jurisprudential legitimacy").
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trol over determining which forum will hear the case.73 When
plaintiffs secure a dramatically different outcome simply by
choosing a certain court, the legal system appears arbitrary and
unconcerned with administering fundamental justice. 74 Conse-
quently, this apparent lack of concern for substantive justice
could erode public confidence in the legal system.
Despite the unseemliness of allowing a plaintiff's choice of fo-
rum to control the outcome of the dispute, some commentators
continue to argue that forum shopping is a benign practice that
the courts should not discourage. These commentators note
that forum shopping can create certain benefits. For example, in-
creasing a plaintiff's chance of recovery can encourage potential
plaintiffs to look to courts to find remedies, thereby serving the
interests of justice.76 Forum shopping can also provide remedies
to injured parties who would not otherwise have legal recourse.77
Supporters of forum shopping suggest that courts need not dis-
courage forum shopping simply because it favors plaintiffs. Al-
though the opportunity to forum shop gives a tactical advantage
to plaintiffs, other aspects of the legal system more favorable to
defendants may offset this.
78
Forum shopping can also lead to efficient results. Plaintiffs
may benefit both parties by choosing a forum that minimizes the
administrative costs of litigation.79 Similarly, supporters of forum
shopping argue that it leads to efficient results when plaintiffs
look to fora that offer more efficient substantive rules or file in
courts with special expertise, such as the Federal Circuit. 0 Thus,
73 But see id. at 1679 (commenting that defendants can also engage in forum
shopping by exercising removal to federal court, by challenging jurisdiction or
venue, or by moving for a dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds).
74 See id. at 1686 (noting that forum shopping exposes tension between the
popular positivist ideals of uniformity of law and the realities of administering a
multi-jurisdictional legal system).
75 See id. at 1690 (stating that interpretations of the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility and Model Rules of Professional Conduct have required a
lawyer to engage in forum shopping as long as it does not harass the defendant
and it increases the likelihood oa favorable outcome for the client).
76 See id. at 1692-93 (commenting that forum shopping facilitates a major
goal of the legal system, the enforcement of legal remedies).
77 See Juenger, supra note 10, at 571.
78 See Note, supra note 35, at 1689.
71 See id. at 1692.




defenders of forum shopping claim that it leads to neither unfair-
ness nor inefficiency.
Although international forum shopping may, in certain cases,
lead to beneficial results, it generally leads to inefficiency, while
creating foreign relations problems. Forum shopping makes the
application of law less predictable, thereby causing inefficiencies
from businesses wasting resources in attempts to determine what
rule of law will govern their conduct. 81 This is particularly true
in international forum shopping because of the wide disparity of
legal outcomes available in U.S. and foreign courts. When the in-
formation costs of determining the legal ramifications of action
reach a certain level, parties act in ignorance of the law.82 Such a
result undermines the capacity of the law to encourage efficient
behavior because effective deterrence requires that parties know
the consequences of their actions.83 Problems of uncertainty are
particularly acute in international tort cases. Because of the diffi-
culty of identifying, ex ante, domicile and other choice of law
characteristics of unknown victims, parties face particularly high
information costs when attempting to predict the legal conse-
quences of risky behavior.
84
Opportunities for forum shopping increase litigation costs.
For international disputes in which the choice of forum has a
dramatic effect on the outcome of litigation, the possibility of fo-
rum shopping encourages parties to waste resources fighting over
81 See Joseph H. Sommer, The Subsidiary: Doctrine Without a Cause?, 59
FoRDHAM L. REV. 227, 254 (1990). But see Note, supra note 35, at 1692
(nuing that forum shopping oes not significantly decrease the predictability
of litigation because lega rles are inherently unpredictable in the modern
comlex legal regime).
See Sommer, supra note 81, at 254 (observing that "resources are limited
and only a certain amount of legal research is cost efficient").
83 See id. (noting that ignorance of legal outcomes often inefficiently de-
creases activity levels because parties recognize that forum shopping generally
leads to inefficiently increased liability).
84 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 145 (1971)
(stating that the domicile, residence, and nationality of parties should be taken
into account in determining the applicable law).
For an argument that forum shopping does not increase uncertainty of out-
come, see Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142
U. PA. L. REV. 949, 1015 (1994) (claiming that uncertainty is not increased be-
cause "both parties can assume that the plaintiff will choose" the forum most
likely to permit recovery). Sterk's analysis fails, however, to take into account
the relevance of ex ante difficulties in identifying which fora will be available to
potential plaintiffs.
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the choice of forum.8 A court must rule on issues of jurisdiction
and choice of law before it can consider the merits of the case.
This can result in a wasteful expenditure of resources on cases
dismissed without an ultimate resolution of the underlying dis-
pute.
86
Forum shopping also leads to the application of inefficient le-
gal remedies. Plaintiffs, when given the opportunity, naturally
seek the most plaintiff-friendly forum.87 Unfortunately, the most
pro-plaintiff outcome is not always the most efficient outcome.
By allowing plaintiffs to avoid substantively efficient laws which
may be plaintiff unfriendly, forum shopping promotes inefficien-
cies. 8 The law of a given jurisdiction may be appropriate for lo-
cal conditions but inappropriate for circumstances elsewhere.
89
Because conditions differ more widely among nations than among
U.S. states, there may be a greater chance that a given legal rem-
edy will be inefficiently applied in international disputes. For in-
stance, the indigent residents of some less-developed countries
may not be able to afford to pay for the greater security that
higher product liability creates. When plaintiffs file in a forum
foreign to the cause of action, the plaintiff may be avoiding effi-
cient legal remedies in favor of inefficiently generous recoveries.
91
Thus, a plaintiff from a poor country may sue in the United
States in order to avoid a lower standard of care and level of liabil-
ity that could be appropriate for the sales of pharmaceutical in
that nation. 92 In this way, international forum shopping system-
atically favors the enforcement of generous U.S. legal rules even
when restrictive foreign rules would lead to efficient outcomes.
See Barry Friedman & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Fragmentation of the
Federal Rules, 79 JUDICATURE 67, 70 (1995) (noting that "[t]he more two sides
in a lawsuit see the costs or outcome dependiig on the district where the case is
litigated, the more there will be fights over venue and jurisdiction").
86 See Besharov, supra note 43, at 141 (noting that the majority of foreign
claims are dismissed, but only after very expensive and time consuming litiga-
tio, See Sterk, supra note 84, at 1015.
88 See Note, supra note 35, at 1692.
89 See Harrison v. Wyeth Lab, 510 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (arguing
that societies with different problems and resources might give different weight
to various factors associated with the use and risks of contraceptives).
90 See id.
91 See POSNER, supra note 46, at 587.




This process results in an inefficient, global over-deterrence of ac-
tivity.
Tolerance of international forum shopping also compromises
principles of judicial comity and impinges on foreign state sover-
eignty.94 In order to give respect to the home jurisdiction's sover-
eignty, U.S. courts must limit a plaintiff's awards to what would
be available if the parties had litigated the case in the home fo-
rum.95 Unfortunately, because of the procedural differences be-
tween domestic and foreign courts, U.S. courts achieve results
that are much more plaintiff friendly, even when applying foreign
substantive law.96 Choice of law rules are used by courts only to
choose the substantive and not the procedural rules that are to
govern the case.9 7  Thus, courts do not change their procedural
rules even when differences between procedural rules would be
outcome determinative. Thus, regardless of the choice of law
rules employed by a U.S. court, a foreign plaintiff suing in the
United States will obtain treatment different from that received
by a comparable plaintiff suing at home.98 For this reason, a U.S.
tribunal may find enforcing the appropriate rule as determined by
the home jurisdiction impossible.
Allowing forum shoppers to sue in U.S. courts not only hin-
ders foreign relations," but also hurts foreign nations by under-
93 See Sommer, supra note 81, at 257.
94 See Peter J. Carney, Comment, International Forum Non Conveniens:
"Section 1404.5"--A Proposal in the Interest of Sovereignty, Comity, and Individ-
ualJutice, 45 AM. U.L. REV. 415, 421-22 (1995). But see Note, supra note 35, at
1694 (arguing that "[i]mposition of [United States] laws on such [sophisticated
MNC] defendants is hardly analogous to a colonial power's insensitive or in-
flexible application of its own laws to a colony's radically different culture and
beliefs").
95 See In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d 1147, 1178-79
(5th Cir. 1987) (Gee, J., concurring in part, dissenting inpart) (stating that in
reviewing jury awards in foreign claims made in the United States, the appellate
court should look to the same culture that supplied the law and that U. S.
courts should try to attempt to approximate daiage awards obtainable in the
plaintiff's home state).
96 See Besharov, supra note 43, at 146.
97 See id
98 See id.
9 "The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be en-
couraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept
that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts.... We
cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters ex-
clusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts." The
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mining their development of legal remedies to handle legal con-
troversies in their own courts." Other countries can better as-
sess their own localized needs and set appropriate standards for
local conditions. 10 1 For example, U.S. courts are "ill-equipped to
set a standard of product safety for drugs sold in other coun-
tries." 1°2 Moreover, U.S. legislatures do not often anticipate the
application of American law to cases outside of the United
States. 103
Forum shopping in the international context also handicaps
MNCs with contacts in the United States. Allowing foreign
plaintiffs to take advantage of generous U.S. liability awards raises
the prices that MNCs subject to jurisdiction in the United States
must charge foreign consumers. Studies have, for instance,
found that U.S. liability awards have increased the prices of small
aircraft by as much as fifty per cent and the price of vaccines by a
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) (arguing that foreign fo-
rum selection clauses should be enforced).100 •c
See Carney, supra note 94, at 422 (arguing that "the best solution is to
reform the federal doctrine [offorum non conveniens] to encourage the devel-
opment of foreign forums so that they are capable of protecting their own citi-
zens"). For a response to the argument that MNCs oMen encourage developing
nations to compete for business opportunities and engage in a race to the ot-
tom by reducing regulations on businesses; see z. at 458 (noting that over time
developing nations gain leverage in dealing with MNCs).
101 See Boyce, supra note 37, at 220.
102 Harrison v. Wyeth Lab., 510 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Judge We-
iner argued that:
The impropriety of such an approach would be even more clearly seen
if the foreign country involved was, for example, India, a country with
a vastly different standard of living, wealth, resources, level of health
care and services, values, morals and beliefs than our own. Most sig-
nificantly, our two societies must deal with entirely different and
highly complex problems of population growth and control. Faced
with different needs, problems and resources in our example India
may, in balancing the pros and cons of a drug's use, give different
weight to various factors than would our society, and more easily con-
dude that any risks associated with the use of a particular oral contra-
ceptive are far outweighed by its overall benefits to India and its peo-
ple.
Id. at 4-5.
103 See William L. Reynolds, The Proper Forum for a Suit: Transnational Fo-
rum Non Conveniens and Counter-Suit Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 70 TEx.
L. REV. 1663, 1709 (1992) ("American law... is not made with the extraterrito-
rial case in mind.").
104 See Besharov, supra note 43, at 142.
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factor of ten to twenty.' °5 This creates inefficiencies as foreign
consumers are encouraged to buy from non-American suppliers
who may be less efficient.' 6 Moreover, the threat of trade disad-
vantages encourages U.S. manufacturers to leave this country to
seek more defendant-favorable jurisdictions, even when efficiency
reasons dictate continued presence in the United States.
0 7
This problem can affect the behavior of both foreign and do-
mestic corporations. Foreign MNCs may believe that they can-
not afford to do business in the United States because to do so
would involve a dramatic increase in liability for their activities
outside the United States.'0 8 The threat of international forum
shopping in the United States, by artificially penalizing MNCs
with minimum contacts in the United States, encourages MNCs
to sever their ties to this country.109
This analysis suggests that the special circumstances of interna-
tional disputes brought against MNCs imply strong arguments for
a judicial response that prohibits plaintiffs from forum shopping
in the United States.
105 See Robert Litan, The Liability Explosion and American Trade Perform-
ance: Myths and Realities, in TORT LAW AND THE PuBLic INTEREST 127, 143
(Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991).
106 Increased liability alters the comparative advantage of U.S. based indus-
tries. See id. at 128, 143 (noting that exporting liability probably does not affect
the overall trade level but could affect the composition of trade by altering
comparative advantage of different industries). As a result, greater liability
hurts more efficient U.S. producers, while changes in the exchange rates aid in-
efficient producers. Seeid
107 See Birnbaum & Dunham, supra note 65, at 261.
108 Cf. Duplantier, supra note 33, at 780-81 (suggesting that businesses will
avoid doing business in states that do not allowforum non conveniens dismiss-
als). 1 09 See Jacqueline Duval-Major, Note, One-Way Ticket Home: The Federal
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and the International Plaintiff, 77 CORNELL
L. REV. 650, 674-75 (1992). MNCs seek countries offering them the lowest
costs and highest returns; this could entail searching for a ower standard of
regulation that offers a lower possibility of liability. See id.
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4. USE OF THE FORUMNON CONVENIENS DOCTRINE TO
CONTROL INTERNATIONAL FORUM SHOPPING
4.1. Federal Courts and the Development of the Forum Non
Conveniens Doctrine
The Supreme Court has most significantly responded to the
problem of international forum shopping through the develop-
ment of the forum non conveniens doctrine. Expansion of per-
sonal jurisdiction and the subsequent increased forum shopping
have created the need for some limits on a plaintiff's choice of fo-
rum.110 The Supreme Court has not responded to this problem
by contracting personal jurisdiction because most justices have be-
lieved that jurisdiction needs to be somewhat generous in order to
ensure that a plaintiff has at least one easily accessible forum in
which to pursue a remedy.111 Instead, the Court has seized upon
the old doctrine of forum non conveniens and expanded it to meet
the modern need at hand-reduction of opportunities for forum
shopping. 1 2
Forum non conveniens has a long history. 13 For over a cen-
tury, courts have applied forum non conveniens and similar doc-
trines in admiralty cases involving foreign parties. 114  Courts of
equity exercised the power to decline, in the interests of justice,
cases over which they had jurisdiction, especially cases between
aliens."' In deciding whether or not to exercise jurisdiction, these
courts traditionally looked at factors such as citizenship or domi-
cile of the parties, place of registration of ships, availability of
110 See Alexander Reus, Judicial Discretion: A Comparative View of the Doc-
trine of Forum Non Conveniens in the United States, ihe United Kingdom, and
Germany, 16 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 455, 470 (1994).
'1' See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947).
11 See Perusahaan Umum Listrik Negara Pusat v. M/V Tel Aviv, 711 F.2d
1231, 1234-35 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Reus, supra note 110, at 470.
113 The doctrine is generally considered to have originated in Scottish
courts. See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 (1994).
114 See The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 361-63 (1885);see also Canada Malting
Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 421 (1932 (noting that courts
traditionally have had discretion, under American law, to decline jurisdiction in
admiralty cases between foreigners even if the action arose in the United
States.
us See Canada Malting, 285 U.S. at 423.
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compulsory process for witnesses, place of contracting, place of
wrong, and the central point of the relationship.
116
In 1946, the Supreme Court formalized the doctrine of forum
non conveniens in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert."7 Under the Gilbert
test, a court reviewing a motion to dismiss should balance the pri-
vate and public interests to determine whether or not the forum is
appropriate." 8 Private interests include "access to sources of
proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of un-
willing, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses;
possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to
the action;... practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive."11 9 The Court focused its public in-
terest analysis mainly on the advantages of having "localized con-
troversies decided at home" and allowing the forum to avoid un-
tanglinj "problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to
itself."' 0 When conducting the balancing of these interests, the
Court stressed that the plaintiff's choice of forum was entitled to
deference, and that absent a balance strongly in favor of dismissal,
the plaintiff's choice of forum should prevail.'
2 1
Although the rule created in Gilbert offered some solace to
MNCs and other potential victims of forum shopping, the Gilbert
rule was really aimed at controlling the administrative costs of
litigation and preventing plaintiffs from choosing particularly in-
convenient forums merely to vex or harass a defendant. '9 Fur-
thermore, the Gilbert test did not deal with the special problems
of international forum shopping.
Thirty-five years later, the Court revisited the problem in
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno. 123 For the first time, in Reyno, the
Court directly addressed the problem of international forum
116 See, e.g., id. at 423-424.
11 330 U.S. 501 (1946).
118 Forum non conveniens can never apply without jurisdiction. See id. at
504.
119 Id at 508.
120 Id. at 509. The Court also addressed administrative concerns "when
litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin"
and the problem of imposing the burden of jury duty"upon the people of a
community which has no relation to the litigation." Id. at 508-09.
See id at 508.
122 See id at 507.
123 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
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shopping. 124 The factual setting of Reyno typified the usual inter-
national forum shopping dispute.12 5 Families of the victims of an
airplane crash in Scotland brought a wrongful death action in the
United States against the U.S. corporation that manufactured the
fallen aircraft." None of the plaintiffs were American citizens.
Moreover, the case had essentially no contacts to the United
States other than the presence of the defendant, an American cor-
poration. 27 The plaintiffs candidly admitted to bringing suit in
the United States merely to take advantage of the more favorable
procedural rules and damage awards.
12 1
Rather than creating an entirely new doctrine to govern fo-
rum shopping in international disputes, the Court in Reyno
stretched the old Gilbert standard to fit this new problem. Under
the revised approach, the same private and public interests were
to be weighed by courts contemplating a forum non conveniens
dismissal. The Court's application of the standard, nevertheless,
showed a greater concern for the problem of international forum
shopping. Specifically, the Court suggested that a district court
should give little deference to a foreign plaintiff's choice of forum
when suing in a U.S. court."3 Justice Marshall, writing for the
majority, noted that plaintiffs in U.S. courts enjoyed many pro-
124 Domestic transfers for convenience have, subsequent to Gilbert, been
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1995). Section 1404(a) permits a federal district
court to transfer a case to another district court "[fjor the convenience of parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Because 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) governs transfers for convenience between federal courts, the
forum non conveniens doctrine is limited to dismissals in cases for which the al-
ternate forum is either a foreign or a state court. As a practical matter, the use
of theforum non convenzens doctrine is generally limited to international dis-
putes following the model set forth in Reyno and is primarily used by MNCs
trying to defend suits against foreign plaintiffs. See Duval-Major, supra note
109, at 670; cf American Dredging Co., 510 U.S. at 449-50. Section 1404 trans-
fers, unlikeforum non conveniens dismissals, do not discourage forum shopping
for substantive law because the court which receives a S 1404 transfer must ap-
ply the same law as the transferring court. See Norwood, supra note 42, at 318.
125 See Reyno, 454 U.S. at 240 (1981).
126 See id.
127 See id.
128 See id.;cf Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1226 n.4
(3d Cir. 1995) noting that although foreign plaintiffs are entitled to less defer-
ence than domestic plaintiffs, they may be entitled some deference in their
choice of forum).
129 See Reyno, 454 U.S. at 252 n.18.
130 See id. at 255-56.
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cedural advantages and that these advantages often enticed foreign
plaintiffs to bring suit in an inconvenient U.S. forum far from
home.131 The Court rejected the notion that district courts must
entertain these foreign suits with slight ties to the United States.
The Court in Reyno continued to recite the traditional policies
of promoting administrative efficiency and convenience for the
litigants as the motives behind the forum non conveniens doctrine.
The Court's approach, however, showed an intent to limit forum
shopping in international suits brought by foreign plaintiffs seek-
ing to take advantage of the procedural advantages afforded by
U.S. courts.132 Lower courts applying the Reyno approach have
generally decided forum non conveniens dismissals by determining
the extent of contacts between the dispute and the United States,
and by determining which forum would be most appropriate to
decide the case.
133
When conducting its forum non conveniens analysis, the Court
in Reyno gave particular attention to the issue of choice of law. It
restated the assertion made in Gilbert that a choice of law analysis
indicating the application of foreign law mitigated in favor of
dismissal. Moreover, the Court stated that in the forum non con-
veniens inquiry, the possibility of a change in law unfavorable to
the plaintiff should not carry substantial weight. 134 Nevertheless,
131 See id. at 252 n.18.
132 See id.; see also Boyce, supra note 37, at 215-16 (noting that what is really
at stake in dismissals is not convenience for the court or for the defendant, but
the extent of defendant's potential liability). Almost allforum non conveniens
cases are never brought in the alternative forum after dismissal. See Reus, supra
note 110, at 474. This suggests that plaintiffs bring suits in the United States
not for reasons of mere convenience and efficiency but because their opportuni-
ties for recovery are substantially limited outside of the United States.
133 See, e.g., Harrison v. Wyeth Lab., 510 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (E.D. Pa. 1980)ee
also Birnbaum & Dunham, supra note 65, at 249-50.
134 See Reyno, 454 U.S. at 247.
In rare circumstances... where the remedy offered by the other fo-
rum is clearly unsatisfactory, the other forum may not be an adequate
alternative, and the initial requirement [for a forum non conveniens
dismissal] may not be satisfied. Thus, for example, dismissal would
not be appropriate where the alternative forum does not permit litiga-
tion of the subject matter of the dispute.
Id. at 254, n.22. The need to determine the adequac of the alternate forum has
resulted in extensive litigation over the issue of w at constitutes an adequate
alternate forum. See Ceramic Corp. of America v. Inka Maritime Corp., 1 F.3d
947, 949-50 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding alternate forum is inadequate if the alter-
nate forum would itself dismiss because it would enforce a forum selection
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the Court stated that, in certain cases, the alternate forum might
provide an inadequate remedy and, therefore, dismissal would be• _ 135 -
inappropriate.
The determination of the adequacy of the alternate forum in
reference to statutes of limitations and other time relevant factors
is to be determined at the time of dismissal and not when the
plaintiff brought the original suit.136  This ruling significantly
strengthened the effectiveness of forum non conveniens for restrict-
ing international forum shopping because the alternate forum in
international disputes almost always provides a reduced opportu-
nity for recovery.137
In certain specific international contexts, federal judges have
modified the Reyno standard to meet the needs of the particular
circumstances. When adapting the doctrine to these special con-
texts, the courts have shown sensitivity to the relevance of the
problems posed by international forum shopping. In interna-
tional in rem admiralty disputes, courts have rejected the new
Reyno standard and have applied the more plaintiff-friendly Gil-
bert approach. 138 One possible justification for the courts' differ-
ent treatments of in rem admiralty cases as compared with other
international disputes is that plaintiffs may have fewer opportuni-
ties for forum shopping in admiralty in rem suits. With jurisdic-
tion based solely upon the physical presence of the defendant ship
and not upon the more lenient minimum contacts standard, a
clause); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, 634 F. Supp.
842, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (unaval-ability of jury trials, class action suits, or con-
tingent fees does not make alternate forum inadequate); Bhatnagar v. Surrendra
Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1228 (3d Cir. 1995) (delay in litigation of a quarter
century in alternate forum is so long as to make the alternate forum inade-
quate). In addition, some courts have found that "extremely low ceilings on
damages or a coercive political atmosphere may render a forum inadequate."
See Carney, supra note 94, at 439. Financial burdens alone, however, usually are
not considerea enough to make an otherwise adequate forum inadequate. See
Reynolds, supra note 103, at 1668-69.
135 See Reyno, 454 U.S. at 254.
136 See Perusahaan Umum Listrik Negara Pusat v. M/V Tel Aviv, 711 F.2d
1231, 1238 n.19 (5th Cir. 1983). Because of the low standard for determining
the adequacy of the alternate forum, most foreign forums are deemed adequate
under Reyno. See Carney, supra note 94, at 437.
137 See supra Section 3.
138 See Perusahaan, 711 F.2d at 1236.
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plaintiff has only one choice of forum and thus no chance to
shop.
139
In addressing international disputes covered by the Warsaw
Convention,14° however, the Fifth Circuit has held that federal
courts should apply the normal Reyno standard. 14 1 Such an ap-
proach accords with a concern for reducing forum shopping be-
cause Warsaw Convention cases allow plaintiffs almost the same
potential to forum shop as do ordinary international disputes.
Although the Warsaw Convention imposes ceilings on damage
awards, it does not significantly deter forum shopping plaintiffs
who generally seek U.S. courts for procedural rather than sub-
stantive advantages. 42 In addition, unlike the defendants in in
rem admiralty disputes, a defendant airline in a Warsaw Conven-
tion action is usually subject to multiple jurisdictions. 143 Hence,
the plaintiff has an opportunity to pick and choose the most at-
tractive forum-usually a U.S. court.
Federal courts' treatment of forum selection clauses in inter-
national actions seems similarly directed at the peculiar problems
of international forum shopping. When forum selection clauses
are clear and reasonable and appear to be the result of a voluntary
agreement, the courts will enforce the forum selection clauses de-
.. See id. at 1240 n.24 (stating that the Court is "not as suspicious of a
plaintiff's motive for bringing his action in a foreign forum [inin rem admiralty
actions] as [it] might be in an in personam action").
140 The Warsaw Convention, signed by the United States in 1934, is an in-
ternational treaty that regulates claims that arise between passengers and inter-
national air carriers. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d
1147, 1160-61 (5th Cir. 1987). The treaty provides for limitations on liability
and jurisdictional requirements. See id.
41 See id. at 1162.
142 Article 28(2) of the Warsaw Convention provides that "[q]uestions of
procedure shall be governed by the law of the court to which the case is submit-
ted." Id- at 1161 (quoting the Warsaw Convention article 28(2)). Plaintiffs can
also attempt to circumvent the substantive requirements of the Warsaw Con-
vention by recharacterizing an injury claim as a products liability action. See
Juenger, supra note 10, at 561.
3 Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention identifies four different na-
tional forums that have jurisdiction over actions against an international airline.
See Juenger, supra note 10, at 561 n.62. (noting that an action may be brought,
.at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one the High Contracting Par-
ties, either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or his principal place
of business ... through which the contract has been made, or before the court
at the place of destination") (quoting the Warsaw Convention article 28(1)).
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spite any claims of inconvenience by the defendant. 144 By con-
tracting in advance, parties can eliminate uncertainty and select an
efficient remedy. When a forum selection clause is vague or uses
permissive language, 145 however, the courts have not accorded
much deference to the forum provisions. 146 This approach is vi-
able if courts wish to discourage forum shopping because permis-
sive forum selection clauses, by presenting plaintiffs with a greater
choice of forums, encourage forum shopping.
4.2. Forum Non Conveniens in the State Courts
Most state courts have adopted a forum non conveniens stan-
dard very similar to the federal standard created by Gilbert and
Reyno.147 There remains, however, a wide variety in the approach
taken towards international forum shopping by the state courts.
14 8
Several states have narrower standards for forum non conveniens
that afford less protection to MNC defendants. 149  In a small
number of states, the "existence of a forum non conveniens doc-
trine is a completely open question. " "s Forum shopping plain-
144 But see Royal Bed & Spring Co. v. Famossul Industria, 906 F.2d 45, 51
(1st Cir. 1990) (stating that a forum selection clause is not determinative, but is
only one of several factors a court should consider in a normalforum non con-
veniens analysis). The court in Royal Bed & Spring seemed to be more con-
cerned with the court's convenience and burdens, rather than the defendant's.
See id.
145 A permissive forum selection clause is one that uses permissive language
such as "may be brought" rather than definite and binding language, such as.must be brought." See Blanco v. Banco Industrial De Venezuela, S.A., 997
F.2d 974, 979 (2d Cir. 1993).
146 See id.
147 See Robertson & Speck, supra note 63, at 950-51 (stating that 36 states
have explicitly or implicitly adopted the federal doctrine or something very
closely resembling it); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS S
84 (1971) (explaining that "[a] state will not exercise jurisdiction if it is a seri-
ously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action provided that a more ap-
propriate forum is available to the plaintiff").
148 The lack of uniformity among states' forum non conveniens doctrines
may be disappearing. See Clagett, supra note 5, at 524-25 (arguing that competi-
tive pressures encourage states not to lag behind others in the adoption of busi-
ness friendly doctrines which reduce corporate liability); Robertson & Speck,
supra note 63, at 951-52 (noting that transnational tort litigation has increased
in states that have not adopted the federal standard, thus pressuring these states
to adopt the federal doctrine).
149 See Robertson & Speck, supra note 63, at 951-52.
150 Id. For example, Louisiana law generally does not allow forforum non
conveniens dismissals. See id. at 951 (citation omitted). The Texas Supreme
[V/ol 19:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss1/5
FOR UM NON CONVENIENS
tiffs can attempt to exploit the differences between the state's fo-
rum non conveniens policies by suing MNCs in states which disfa-
vor the doctrine.
151
5. CRITICISMS OF THE USE OF FOR UM NON CONVENIENS TO
CONTROL INTERNATIONAL FORUM SHOPPING
Commentators have raised several criticisms of the Reyno
standard as it applies to international suits. First, some critics
claim that the Reyno approach unduly discriminates against for-
eign plaintiffs. Because a court applying the Reyno standard ac-
cords greater deference to domestic plaintiffs than to foreigners,
the court may give different treatment to two litigants with the
same circumstances except citizenship. 152 Such a result seems un-
fair given that a domestic plaintiff injured abroad is as likely to
forum shop in the United States as is a foreign plaintiff.'53
This criticism oversimplifies the Reyno analysis. The Court
based its distinction between foreign and domestic plaintiffs, not
on their nationality, but on the likelihood that a given glaintiff's
choice of forum would be convenient and appropriate. 4 A do-
mestic plaintiff's choice of forum in the United States is more
likely to be convenient for that plaintiff and thus more likely to
lead to administrative efficiencies and less likely to be based on in-
appropriate forum shopping considerations. In addition, the
Reyno analysis does not foreclose the possibility of dismissal when
Court also rejected the doctrine offorum non conveniens, but the legislature re-
instated the doctrine. See Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674,
674 (Tex. 1990).
15 But see Iuenger, supra note 10, at 563-64 (explaining the case law barring
foreign plantiffs from suing in U.S. courts for overseas accidents). There are
few federal or constitutional limitations on state courts' treatment of interna-
tional cases. See Robertson & Speck, supra note 63, at 973 (noting that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause provides only a modest restric-
tion on state courts'forum non conveniens precedents).
52 Cf Norwood, supra note 42, at 319-20 (explaining that deference to a
plaintiff's choice of forum began in order to allow plaintis to sue at home, and
that this is no longer justifiedy.
153 See, e.g., Carter v. Trafalgar Tours Ltd., 704 F. Supp. 673, 673 (W.D.
Vir. 1989) (holding that Virginia was the proper forum for a suit brought by a
Virginia citizen against a British corporation which arranged a European tour
that resulted in injury to the plaintiff in Austria even though Austrian law ap-
plied to the controveisy).
154 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1981).
155 See ia at 256.
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a domestic plaintiff brings suit; rather, Reyno takes the sensible
approach that a district court should undertake a balancin, of in-
terests, of which convenience of the plaintiff is only one. 56 s-
sentially, the Reyno approach takes into account that domestic
and foreign plaintiffs are not similarly situated because adminis-
trative efficiency concerns are more likely to support a domestic
plaintiff's choice of forum.
Critics also argue that, even in the federal courts, the doctrine
is not applied consistently because the balancing analysis is left to
the discretion of the judge. 157 The standard of review for forum
non conveniens dismissals is clear abuse of discretion; thus, appel-
late courts have little power to create uniformity of application of
the doctrine.15 In practice, however, appellate courts often afford
less deference to district court decisions than the clear abuse of
discretion standard implies. 159 Furthermore, application of a
tighter standard of review could reduce the flexibility of the doc-
trine and increase the waste of resources on appeals.
6. ALTERNATIVES TO THE USE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS TO
CONTROL INTERNATIONAL FORUM SHOPPING
6.1. Use of Choice of Law to Restrict Forum Shopping
Reforms in choice of law rules are unlikely to deter interna-
tional forum shopping effectively. Foreign plaintiffs are drawn to
United States courts more for procedural than substantive rea-160
sons. Courts only use choice of law rules to determine the ap-
plication of substantive law. For this reason, even choice of law
rules tailored to discourage forum shopping for substantive law
156 See id at 255 n.23.
157 See Robertson & Speck, supra note 63, at 970.
158 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 516 (1947) (Black, J., dis-
senting) ("The broad and indefinite discretion left to federal courts to decide the
question of convenience from the welter of factors which are relevant to such a
judgment, will inevitably produce a complex of close and indistinguishable de-
cisions from which accurate prediction of the proper forum will become diffi-
cult, if not impossible.").
159 See Lehman v. Humphrey Cayman, Ltd., 713 F.2d 339, 342-44 (1983)
(claiming to apply the clear abuse of discretion standard, yet actually giving lit-
tle deference to the trial court); Reynolds, supra note 103, at 1686-87 (arguing
that appellate courts actually engage in a "meaningful, almost de novo, stan-
dard" bf review in forum non conveniens decisions).
160 See Besharov, supra note 43, at 140.
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will not effectively control the problem of international forum
shopping in U.S. courts. 61 Furthermore, it is unlikely that the
states will adopt a uniform set of choice of law rules designed to
discourage forum shopping. The Constitution does little to unify
state choice of law because the Supreme Court has held that the
Due Process and Full Faith and Credit clauses provide little re-
straint on state choice of law rules. 1
62
6.2. Use ofDue Process Restrictions on Jurisdiction to Limit
International Forum Shopping
Similar problems attend the use of due process restrictions on
jurisdiction to curb international forum shopping. First, any
change in jurisdictional rules that would significantly restrict in-
ternational forum shopping requires a substantial revision of the
current due process analysis and the rejection of years of prece-
dent. Although recent decisions have strengthened the
"reasonableness" requirement that limits the assertion of specific
jurisdiction, the Court has restated that the more problematic
general jurisdiction remains constitutionally valid.
163
Practical reasons also weigh against the use of jurisdictional re-
straints to control international forum shopping. A change in the
requirements of jurisdiction would affect domestic as well as in-
ternational litigation. 164 The current rules may be efficient for
161 For an argument that choice of law rules should apply to the selection
of procedural law, as well as substantive law, see id. at 146. Unfortunately,
many of the procedural advantages sought by international forum shoppers are
constitutionally mandated and therefore could not be dropped in favor of for-
eign procedures. See, e.g., JAMES supra note 23, at 422 (noting that the historical
right to jury trial is likely to remain in the U.S.). In addition, it seems unlikely
that an American tribunal could ever apply foreign law to achieve the same re-
sults as a foreign court.
162 See Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307 (1981) ("[A] set of
facts giving rise to a lawsuit, or a particular issue within a lawsuit, may justify,
in constitutional terms, application of the law of more than one jurisdiction.").
163 See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113
(1987) (holding that reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction depends on
several factors, including a balancing of private and public interests); see also
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (holding that general ju-
risdiction based on presence is proper); Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 (stating
that state courts may properly exercise jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
in a cause of action which does not arise out of or relate to the foreign corpora-
tion's activities in the forum state if minimum contacts exist).
164 But see Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International
Cases, 17 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 7-8, 43 (1987) (stating that some lower
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domestic litigation, for which forum shopping is less of a con-
cern. 16  Use of the forum non conveniens doctrine, however, al-
lows courts to deter international forum shopping while preserv-




Courts have developed the modern forum non conveniens doc-
trine to respond to the problems posed by international forum
shopping. Although use of the doctrine does not prevent all fo-
rum shopping or solve all forum selection problems, it does pro-
vide MNCs and other potential victims of overzealous forum
shoppers with a means of defense. 167 More importantly, because
of the flexibility of forum non conveniens doctrine, courts can
limit international forum shopping without compromising ad-
ministrative efficiency in domestic litigation. Moreover, although
some commentators have criticized the approach as inadequate, it
is difficult to conceive of another, more effective measure that
would not contradict constitutional requirements or involve the
overturning of large bodies of precedent. Instead of pursuing
radical change, the courts should continue to evolve the forum
non conveniens doctrine to deal with the needs of the day. For
this reason, the courts should retain a flexible approach to forum
non conveniens, one that allows district courts to balance relevant
factors in determining the most appropriate forum.
68
courts have rejected the majority approach by applying different personal juris-
diction standards to foreign defendants).
165 See supra Section 3.
166 See Perusahaan Umum Listrik Negara Pusat v. M/V Tel Aviv, 711 F.2d
1231, 1239 (5th Cir. 1983) (arguing that the current system which couples ex-
tensive jurisdiction withforum non conveniens combines the benefits of allow-
ing a plaintiff to bring an action against a "potentially elusive defendant" with
the advantage of allowing a transfer to a more convenient forum).
167 See Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum non
Conveniens in International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a
Uniform Standard, 28 TEX. INT'L L.J. 501, 518(993) (noting the many dismiss-
als from U.S. courts based on the Piper standard).
16' For an example of the proper use of this standard, see Harrison v.
Wyeth Lab., 510 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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